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National defense In the j not
only the largest and foremost business of our nation to-day—it
is also without doubt the most expensive venture \: tr
boon forced to undertake. It demands that we build d so
that we are prepared for both a Ion ;?orld "on and
the Ability of an enemy attac'- that at any plun
our country into full-scale, rlobal war» Sbii readiness, requir-
ing as it does the naintaining of relatively large, well-e'-nipped
armed forces, vast facilities and /hich nt
immediate, o Veetive mobilir ' i, con bt purchased only wit
,rmous sums of money. nd ;
that tho Mount of such I onios W .ich oable must
have solio reasonable limitations.
We in the United os, KhO eoulation-wise, represent
some six per-cont of the world 1 :, peooles, art in 1
ortins froedor: In the balance; to the extent tta y
shares in thia \;orld- litary rea nsihility,
must ever ensure that our -tion is provided at the most en-
able cost possible in view e :.ted which wo
citisons can offer, *vlti such a goal obviously ne-ns
at we tt at all tines hive e::nert man: ut tl

2stabll tj not only at the wit 1 and * u*
levels but also in all of t: leld activities. :::aert
nagenent in turn, requires intelligent, active fiscal control,
a fact lone since acknowledged by private 1 ;ry of even node
size and complexity, whore they con:: tly utilise the fls
controller concept as an id to I .ther or not so
labelled and whether or not vested in the top executive himself
or provided in orm of a staff assistance by controller, a
treasurer, a financi :er or an assistant vice-nresiaent or
an accountant.
If this major premise Is then acec cod, you mat .-lso
accept a corta "arys that effective financial control Is a prober
and nccess vy function of al^ lr: 'al command •-
ment), both in the field and at the Ilavy ant; as muc: of
a commander's responsibility as is tactics or logisti he
I always accepted as 6h< 'product 1 which ly 'industry 1
is selli: .
Or let's take another tack in our pursuit of tht premise
that active, informed financial control ust bee art
of Nav .JL an: ut all commands, Consider fO»
Moment Hie translation Q l."ons we in the military s^end
each year in a fom that is underst ndable to all of us. It has
been figured out by ^ically gifted that one billion
dollars represents a stack of thousand-dollar bills one hundr
feet liicher than t • anumont, a shaft a
are all quite familiar. Hot l f s or 5*t or 10 •s? not 20 *a or 50»s
or even r bills mind you, but one thousand dollr bills!

3I'tirther consider then that t" Q vnl 1 : for the ceding fiscal
year, exclusive of any su- lemer.tal or deficiencies, xd.ll FQffl*
;e twelve blXXion dollars; : nd that this does not begin to sat-
isfy the entire Department of Defense needs, for the "rny and Air
?orce appropriation totals irf.ll drive the single year military
budget upwards of forty billion dollars!
be also that two years of national defense is
•peace-time • rate, only Lady - ^se fr : : .
could estiixitc Hie atomic war rate, eats up the total earnings of
all people in the United State* living west of t. e I ississi .pi J
On a purely numerical basis, t everyone in t
country is 'cvt* some fourteen hundred dollars as his contribution
for only two years of defense, not to mention the addit." out-
lay for the numerous other costs '.oral govey t.
Would we be naive in I -""loving that sound financial man-
agement of these tremendous budgets and expenditures infers full
recognition of fiscal control by major field commands, not merely
top-command in the Navy and Defeat* .ts, \: fiscal
comptrollers are presently mainly utilized. Is it f olish to
believe that extension of this concept of capable financial
control Jc - anders aware of t • c new science of
financial sen ent, will actually save us personal dollars?
side from any selfish tax-dollar interest, most of us -ire so
patriotic that we want to be intensely pmud of our own service
and it's efficiency in storing it*i "portion of public monl
Obviously, we can see that any tool or technique which all

knavy managers can employ In any mf to ore ably ax ielli gently
• command ' sue :ring sums as they In f , it be
accepted as an addition allonge 5 whereas they tion-
ally excelled in operational, tec ;a©ti Is, now
they have stimulation to equally succeed .Upscale business
executives through full gr--.sp of their financial potential. The
naval executive can no more ignore his daily direct concern with
his enormous financial responsibilities of command than can 1
commercial conn .^t, t id of large concern, i -noro i/hat
it 'costs' his c jy to ')ro nee and sell it's particular
product.
Criticism b*i been :.nde that the entire federal budget
is out of control, out that in particular, ilitary portion
is an"incomprehensible monster" 5 if this ir ant be true, then
til in the Military re surely more than fifty per-cent to blame
for we hav Bntly spending ore than half he total
national budget. To this extent, we must endeavor to amelic
the situation, cert inly the naval portion of any 0,
is perhaps no more fertile area to begin building the con.
needed than t is; wider recognition and em -rs
navy-vide of the c ]cially tested and roven conce fiscal
control aa J:" 'ectivo tool it is to navy ' ers* in estab-
lishing and expending their naval all; if
by using it to prove, factej that r 1 are
based on sound needs , sider arienee
and future plans; that their ev 17 ret ist is fully anc wrtly
justified in nor that p e or sugary review by

5utivo fes .nts as well : s by their
arti.ent, tlie :ie or
^cific duties by the .1
executive or required by bin fr~ I aid for
'Controll r* ty^o counsel will be discussed at more i ft in
Chapters 2hree and 'our,
Kr oss, it is of int. oint
that the Bureau of t ' :et foroall; ility:
..•upon departs fel ~
uous aeono icy of Ir
operations and for e -ting na-
tivities, it i the dev 1 t and ke ir
to ldent nd solve na;" a ant prol .
tter device exi *: -
iuent than the constant, profc - -tally- ad infomatio lob
can be easily and adequately provided by a staff consultant,
visor, fin ssistaiit—a T ntrollcr 1 , i l\
concentr te on furr g the executive ! ae
greatest co ibinatiott of military and civilian-type icial
•know-how* 5 he servos yet ho -ii self neither ^s nor controls.
: well is the Captain or t Lral f e ent, in-
forned as to the way the jobs he directs are being performed?
Does big ithly or perhaps quarterly *c • with his presently
purely i J -or -iv-.
-
-cutive e ft ftt, ureau or the ot,
Circular " - 8 , Instructions for Agency Management Improvement
Plans (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950)
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could possibly use ir eels.*
a skilled controller best
;ot for Ids aiMW>Tld t data better suited . ogrsm
inning and oval i of 'native courses, facts crystallized
I slanted solely for executive attention in charting a course.
This the controller can do by established \onal
prlnoi lea of s, research, cc c<
however, and it is to be er.r;harized, lie leaves to those he serve
I
all decision-naidLn;.:, all policy-formulation, direction and oper-
ating supervision? these lino function oil it never
be vested in the controller as such, h, I way only can he be
easpletely objective and without bias in hi ro- ch and utilis-
ation of the nest appropriate survey, " . 'sis and ro-<ortinc t< " -
niques; for he is not saddled with the operating responsibility
of any division or of the cormand, nor even for ecision
Left may be re- chad by the eo: uander hie f cts
available.
There.ore, in the chapters to folic-: we vd.ll consider
the current status devel uroller and the
finan control conceit in order to be understand the
lications for progressive i will analvfc*
recent act o" '-'on :rcs:: i Defense it
controller and controllers for ench of three >art-
ments; we vill exam neral and • ocific duties and 1-
bilitles and goals proper for slve havy Controllers, wl
help they havs been to date and what t" be e:rpec>:ed to
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provide In ture;' how pare :rcial controllers
in techniques and arena o? utilization; and finally, i to
provide at least iisi/er to sucl ations as Whether or
not ho ought to be a full-time career naval controller exclusively,
and whether the control concept as herein described can even be
ld» to skeptical field-lev 1 connands nnd those line staff




LEG;\L HI TORY hLER
The Ratios ecurity Ac'; zs of 19^9 d a new
;le IV to tho National Security Act of 19^7, entitled; "Pro-
motion uf Economy and Efficiency through Establishment of Uniform
y And .Iscal rocedures and Organisations** • 9&t our
impose in this tr atise it necessary only to cite those pro-
visions which have major impact on the military controller^ in
this light | the net results of tho new legislation were that it:
1« Created an Office of the Comptroller of to Department of
Defense, and offices of Comptroller and Deputy ^roller in
each of the three ilitary departments,
2. hequired adoption of a functional or • performance * type
of budget by the Department of Defense.
horized establishment of workim and mt
funds.
h* Recuires maintenance of property and inventory records on
Doth a quantitative and a monetary basis.
It is firmly believed that enactment of Public Lav 23
especially of Sections kQ2,~k<j' h are budgetary in nature,
o-empts the need for, one': ys actually, more th rely
•department* level controllers. (Legally, t
as spelled in tl s; the mt or ore o to spell
their name and pronounce it as •controller 1 in order to avoid
any possible distasteful or erroneous relationship with other




once, such as r-Cteneral,
-roller of Ou: '
etc.) EtathaVj it is felt that these lam sensibly demand t:
practical expedient of the responsible military in
extending the concept to provide so: :eone in every major command
who is qualified to perform the pre 1 "'unction of sound
financial control, irrespective of whether he be the commander
self, or whether the person so- : function be
labelled specifically * controller s.:ip f .
Let* a look at the first cited section, Section UC3,
among other thing! directed utilisation of tea so-calle< ' r-
formince* budget in presenting and justification of future Departs
ment of Defense budgets and estimate . Briefly
v
and in si plost
:, this Means reporting ounting for tha cost of f or-
forming' identifiable functional ^ities, vith
clear segregation of Operational and capital „ ut, you
may say, this new provision of itself need not dictate the estab-
Of additional budgeting or account 7fs or c Wm
ations. lowever, the acts go somewhat beyond merely
so-called •performance* accounts; for example, it specifically
charges the head of the department, and certainly by implication,
sub-ordinate bureau, of -'ice, base, activity area command*
with full responsibility for all financial, fiscal, cost, account-
ing, etc., aspects of the progra , "ssion or command Which they
head or command, or pea it would better serve our purpose to
say, ;o.
They iiust t^ en coast aitly review their military and naval
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is In the customary on with which all ar iliar
t, but must also now ttenttim usly review the ooimv: ' -
financial operations, with all f amifieations that lies,
In order to thus ensure p: an and solution of ths
myriad fiscal problcrU now forcibly a part and parcel of military
na^e o?i'.
I
. rosrlt of Public Law 216,
This latter recuirement then is a new facet, and would ap-
pear to strongly suggest the advisability c aiding the over-
burdened executive with some fc least resembling an estab-
lished control concept, If not a staff controller, as an advise
adjunct to meet his nevly orcl ined financial rianaf-enent role,
it now stands, uadon falls solely on the individual comnander;
his previous :;nna£ orient res nsibilitles, which already occupied
his tine rather fully, will otherwise luted adversely by
the newly imposed budget and fiscal duties,
his primary interest, background and need in purely military oper-
ational tasks, he must now be personally informed in the e-
battle 1 ; must :e hla •.ctiviti- . s in the li^ht of th 've
economy as well as need, the efficiency of the c id in achiev-
ing it* 3 set u To do so, he will need to bo prepared
personally supervise initial ipporti mmentsf to wit! , transfc
or ad«:-to the funds of hif several depart onto, AlVlaio&a or
commands
.
In short, he must be able to shift funds as well
when prudenco so dictates. ..'hat h-.s private i dustry, where tot 1
responsibilities and diversity of t hie to any one
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individual never roach t! ty they do in military c^rmand,
done to meet the even lea- .or challenge to their top era* :er
Ions trial and experience, the progressive e2 is in almoat every
larse-sc aivate enterprise have found the practical answer to
be the utilisation of a staff executive, usually but not ala-ays
labelled as the controller, to furnish t acialize istance
necessary, he became their 'evaluater 1
,
whose sole duty it is to
furnish objective, financial planning data and analysis required
by manage: <cnt in arriving at decisions for vhich the top-executives
couldn't possibly dig-out and research the details 1. Iff
Some naval com ra wit or h- or**
tunity to discuss the concept espoused herein, express fill under*
standing of the manaseaent assistance intended and readil: it
a necessity for such aid; houever, they state uneeuivac-ibly ftftu
the Ultimate purpose of military or naval nmwSJirt is victory at
aea or in combat, and that the volu: i- one .ncial and budget-
ing procedures lead to a flood of questionable paper facts.
Attention IM rely would reduce the time
a comnandea has availabo for hit urinary task, : cozibat
matters. In attempting to defend the control concept to these
senior of leers Whose interests or duties had not yet led then
to explore the financing or dollar aspects,of "ty behind
the dollars they had been seeing as allotments, the author foui
a brief chronological tracing of the naval budget I singularly
helpful. Th« a?al budget process I h yet
there are many enmeshed in it by oc ';:ion \fr.o sc -e
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never :asion to under v the deart' rmatlon
about it| for this reason, and because a cl of
nival budget Is necessary to perceive l at oust
precede every i iture c ] des, as i/ell as the o of
a controller, the steps or phases o ;et are i Lat
The yearly military budget is it' rat step if
Director of the lu of the his capacity c»
utive arm of the Pre si ont, advises department of Defense of
the President 1 s budget policy for the year to fee bud
further provides the Defense Department, as he does all large de-
onts, with a target figure as a ceiling and calls Cox
department * i estimates of appropriations required u5 thin this
ceiling, This 'call 1 i3 normally issued in June, and covers :;he
requires :nts for the Fiscal Year begiiinii: .. 5lve Mentha later.
Actually, the Navy Department, as a practical necessity antici-
pates this call by beginning the voluminous details of it
preparation at least sore six s earlier, in January.
However, upon receipt of the call fro sf -.he
get | the Departlent of Defense's budget officer, the Comptrol-
er, as a staff aid to to-- ont (The Secret ry), then
requests the three ftllltary of Ar:. .y, lr \oreo,'-nd
vy, via their respective co- ptrollers, to forwerd the indivirtual
department est:" . ese department es os in turn -ire
normally United by cc: ; ecretary of Defense.
,o, they may be United by i - doteraim I of tt :ot
Advisory Committee of lb* Joint Chiefs c ', who review indiv-
idual department est:" I in the i of over-all Defense

13
it co-ordination and Force reruireiien
in completion of the •' -
r>osslble task of pre S justifi<< athin
each of the three departments of It's own budget osti ast
seriously begin. Halls the listing of the multitude of detail 3
steps in the ITavy Department would serve no useful purpose in this
study, some idea may be cained of the tnonur: o ortions of
the task by merely noting tliat in the final product there must
be absolutely no weaknesses in expenditure justifications, no dup-
lications of effort, inconsistencies In programs, organization,
management, etc.; this must be positively confirmed by I
internal department review and scrutiny, from field level to
bureau level, a:,one various bureaus and offices, and from the
Chief of Naval Operations down to the very last field commander
whose needs it relates* To do less invites apprehension, lac!:
of confidence, arbitrary crippling redactions and n Thaps doom,
at the hands of the public's review authorities, the Congress.
Excepting their actual conb t role, this request and
justification for the funds w ich are their life-blood, is in
the writer* s opinion the military's foremost task to-day 1 -Pov
without adequate funds, no adequacy in technical skills
,
tactics, Operations etc., can provide the defense the present taut
world demands,
Hext, these completed Individual department budget estimates
go to the Depart tent of Defense and then, after searching revi
and co-ordination there, on to tl- eau of the et by a
statutory deadline of 15 September. Here they are subjected to

a most extensive and lied executive review by the Director of
the Bureau of t dget and ais committees, all thoroughly inform*
ed and expert in the field 1 ich they review. met imp; Tor tl
President li self, they-hold hearing! in order to t detailed
oral amplification by the defense mrtnier 3, rior to any exec-
utive changes they may deem necessary under the President 1 |w
lines. Upon approval or modification, the estimates are trans-
mitted to the President of the United States wo, Respite the
Budget bureau review, nay direct still further a os or justi-
fications 5 \fhen approved by the President, he forwards the entire
federal budget, including yearly military estimates, to t)
ress with nil January budget message.
c next phase is the con: ideration of the budget estimates
by the House of Pvepresentatives 1 A: iation Committee, and in
the case of the military departments* budget, by the Military
Appropriations Sub-Com Ittee; the -y's budget is further specif-
ically handled by the II; w 1 propriations Sub-Committee, In these
sub-comriittees the estimates r\nd their justifications are given
an even more exhaustive and painstaking scrutiny by the * o*
themselves so-to-speakj through I and testimony of of Is
and interested persons, the sixb-eomnlttees determine their final
ropriatio; . osals for sending on to the full committee and
eventually, the fl or of : "use in the form of printed reports
for debate and house action.
IText, similar steps must follov in the United States
Senate; and any differences of -ion in the two bodies must
then be reconciled through joint c nferences of both Routt and
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Senate appropriation commit „
-t,
containing the military 11 as ill other cove: art-
sent appriations, is then transmitted back to the President,
may veto tie mhele Act but nay not change individual mts.
UP in mind nou that this covers only the regular roprl&tl
and estimates; supple) nd deficiency approor
i
st
Invariably requested, and for these, separate estimates and justi-
fications must be prepared, and essentially the same rounds, hear-
ings, and procedures .
As a final step or phase prior to any em ture of funds
by the Kavy Department, any necess my legal
poses must h v i been obtained, the required funding Instituted,
and departtaent requests for apportionments of their g "ic
appropriations forw&rded
Thus, ignoring completely the even more enacting and de-
tailed job of yoar-around execution and control of ;:he budget
actually granted, the steps so briefly noted above mould r
to be sufficient grounds o: . eh to su~/;est t: ossltle
extension of formal 'controller 1 represent: .mion and
to all major field c .ds. Hon could . sslbly exoect t
total llavy budget to be any better or any morse t" an the rami*
ative financial management abilities, or opportunities for concen-
trating on :; balls, of thOM navy exec t \^hoso oanage-
ment skills it reflects* In to-days complexities, each commander
can hardly be expected to be both a financial Croesus and a
tactical Jolin Paul Jbnaa or Mahai .

3GOALS OF SHS C M tOUJtt
In private 1 wry the priuary goal is reputed to be
•profit 1 and all actions and personnel ust necessarily e z;-.e: s«
ured by the extent of their contribution to this objective. ' ot
so in government r ily, and certainly not so in ilit-iry or
ens, for they are an econ-cdc waste e::ee t i-
light of the existence or possible national e >•«
And this basic differ is a Major one, es \n
evaluaoinp the role of a naval activity controller, or in tag
his possible assistance to co: : : :.nc1 (aftm it) as contrasted vita
what the cora-ercial controller furnishe. to hie omenta In
most government agencies or depar -s, in parti c- ,
depart! onts, f s objective is not profit*) eacept for
those few 'corporation 1 type agencies which t ital
funds initially i and who Matt render business-
financial 1 .ants, the government *oal is rather 'ei\\ ctive,
economical' op- ratio . val controller's contribution to man-
agement will be seen Jhc?r3fore, in terns of what specific assistance
he can provide is particular activity * in removing
obstacles to this goal; obstacles 3uch as failur the activity
or command to ae lev, jied objectives; un-nec p * eating,





Department and field-level related aims; t dis- -lance
of facility id services no 1 L or merely 'conven-
ient' rather than actuall; T tary necessity; lack of devices
and st.-ndards for *f its t.
out local divisions; chronic or increasing bae * pk; ex-
cessive personnel turn-over; ly, he car: ly alleviate
the obstacle of tin?' -asonaply high unit-cost ad,
whether logistic, operational, Office, industrial, planning or even
staff work J One must adi.il t that each or these or 'anonies 1
to the military, and that Jf reduction is la the a HP*
est as well s the interest of . lajor activity e aders
large-scale business ' raagors 1 *
! ; • 9M ent a • controller ' awareness or actual rcpre-
aentation can aid in their diminution, to thii same c
naval com and ' fc 1 capitalist on the control tude
and professional interest in art ent f s nam :-
goal and pursuit of higher ts», vis: >*1
and economy in
,
which \/e f v ined as the military's
profits. B us, the naval controller and t ;roller
have in afreet the same goal* M^ ieve it in la hy
the s.nc ie«
It is earnestly oped that readers will not hastily ren-
eraliae fr ... itary controller is empire-
building, that ha envisions hi..sell' ;er, usurping
dltional command pre. ivesj oa lea
himself as a specialist in a nev fi I'fleer career of
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Baval-Con broiler exc e true dder and better
fin 1 ' vbrol* utilisation in 1 : covets
none of these? func sre t he usurps I or
the policyf decision ties uhf ^tach
solely to the eomriirider nor the 1, account!:
-g i
ities historically held by
I for the first . ir, even tl I it m Lai
reflection der; ns . mtroller self
initiate a command alzatic -, or it' ro-
cedures, a id obj ves, of 6
t.ority, Juat or' c Bf Wl I -
Ld is 'a it's .: Ls. cl or
;ise individuals or sub-or t*pon for
/icient, effective ton or to for the lack thereof.
The contrail Pity to inj s,
schedules, plans or rfc or solve c*. ;d
problems o 'co^iisanc Llitary
the matter of action for .icy or for y or
even final evaluation of accoa lii ts. Obvio
are coli rerogat. ves; i: ... alone is
charged I \ then, rldle >st r: .: is to
be sure of etual bo
att .in the ooanu
of winni .'tally luaasurqa in fir. cy
and of .'octivene
;ivity 'seal horn





, .ch is primarily m onaly .




can assi e, condense and i:. i so as tc ji-
or (com; dicier) wi:. ; S factual, ...sine;: -
basis for the latter 1 licy isiox--
, Joj formulation
of plans, programs, .no r-. $ for dfl
weaknesses in effective.:: . .. check-ups
or special further survey in the light of 6 if factors disclosed
by the d rolle .
In short, j onl;, .onal
one of a s I, provl the information, dv\.-. fiscal




in view of led, whether
then the military controller, 11':.o .is q rfe f
11 bo a separ . '.stino ciaity. To answe. Is,
.or need o;tLy point out tl any
naval officer curr< rvfcly in 'the dapa. level controller shop,
including flag rani: ...nd jiuv'or officers, lino officers and staff
corps officers, who '.::o little enough for thci. il
careers, navy wort
,
id desire for diver .iity pre-
uisite to
"
id, tc or continu. ve
controller duty, /crtv jnlze narrow fiscal control
duty for what it is* another phase, albeit . QffVR one, of ex-
tremely valuable training leadinc to the ultimate 3 of all
n.val officers, t©p-co.mand2 /ully ;e controller




busin* ecutive con ander; they keenly vcc< ~
nize the inc a manner: ill bcln^ added to their military.
:111s as a re suit of understanding and cio.tion of the tool
of financial control, lit while enjoying such control duty as
an educational experience much to be sought for as a v. ly no
training for leadership, they wisely perceive altogether too
oat li: itations in a career of exclusive controller typo duty*
;t cots land cones by promotion, hion I
usually only to those best cualified in al^ the diverse and myriad
elements required of th lorn-day naval executive, ,'in nc:"
managev ent still is only one of the many now required.
In this aspect, the military controller Bast difher with
private industry* s controller, who is it always a fiqure
specialist. It is an accepted axiom of est successful coimerci'
concerns that the IftTger and more oy become, the more
demanding th« uirement that they insist on extensive train:L
d continued relatively lnn;>ti yacht of personnel in
narrow, sneeialined fields for v such personnel arc usively
ear-marked, and fro: '.alized mti they must flow
promotion-wise. As a natter of fact, :>riv--.te industry leaders
state they coulh :ot stay in business without adherence to such a
policy.
It often appears inconpieiensible to tS ited
States military forces, vastly larger an4i
than probably the dozen 1 it corporations in our country to-day,
can eve: rate without adopting a Mar policy within the
military establishnont. While it is not the purpose of t
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)Gr to discuss the intrinsic erences between military
mand and commercial business organization methods or require
-
its, sufficient and fundamental variance do exist, in both means
and ends, to ' 7 justify the . Recruitment,
periods of total tenure, service motivations, conditions, tines
and places of employment , conceivable requirement 5 during emergency,
etc., nay suggest some variances; suffice it to say that underly-
inc all is t the o":i 1 or task force inmini|Hln who knmt onl
•financial 1 principles of command x;ould sink few enemy ships or
down few aircraft other than his own.
fortunately, the formal odecatic: 'or
training naval officers in controllership functions recognize
the implausibility of career-controllers for the Navy or i marine
Corps. The existing courses in both civilian and military insti-
tutions syecify that applicants possess broad mature, experience
involving operatic rid command, and restricts selectees to those
ilor IJaval and Marine C officers whose records istr.ite
diversity in ba und*
Contrary to what would be the case if controllers were to
be career specialists, the actual courses btlng ^;iven emphasize
that detailed, clerical, non-executive type shill in book-heoping,
statistics, accounting, fiscal budgeting, etc., are not the aim.
Rather, the fcj ng in these subjects and such others as indust-
rial economics, ath d management and :. :ment en-inoeri
is 1 at and is being successfully directed towards provi
iliarity and shill in the minagennt level technictues of fiscal
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control—not the technical, specialist-level. Designation of cer-
tain active duty billets as specialist billets le only to
controllers would be wholly un-acceptable militarily since it would
deny utilization of existing controller-type billets for in-service
experience and on-the- 3ob- training necc .-•;/. ;se billets, as
well as fornal academic training, are vital avonues to fiscal
experience needed for responsible leader I .---, executive-
level command in t m, costly, tOfcplex nav >lisli':ent.
o much for the comparisons t&A contrasts of comorcial
controllers \rith military ones; let us ROW look to future course
for the military controller and consider his probable contribution
to naval financial mana it*

C : h
Tim NAVAL CONTROLLERS CONTRIBUTION
Too many military ^eople, including unfortunately some
commanders of naval activities, expect that luck, good fortune or
a provident Congress, to-getaer with sore measure of national
hysteria of war, will always provide then with a sufficiency Q
funds for the scope of operations the service needs dictate. Tow-
ever, never Is it been more apparent than now that whatever :ay
have talcen care of the past, in present and future it I
going to have bo be simply nothing less than good, sound business
typo aana I of t!:e naval establishment by all hands, by all
levels of command.
The fore si;;; it, jia t and financial mana Vlity
that must be reflected in future pro ;ra aaing, budgeting and
control of expenditures, and in the development of t3 :ures
that i.dll be demanded by t: >lic to substantiate naval oper-
ations, will in IftVfi measure determine the scope of our naval
readiness, and hestce, on:1 national preparedness. At least so
alternative corrses of action are present DSslble in almost
every problem, program, oper tional plan or -;uation con-
fronting; the naval activity commander. Aft evaluation of each such
alternative in terms of it 1 3 fi aid be made as




successful private ontor -rise nan-. ! standard policy* One needs
but to glance ily m o flood of n< lieies
and rovlsirns to current regulations e : from the Department
of Defence and the Icavy Department in order to recognize the new
era| one of expanded use of : n busin id financial methods
in the planning, budgeting, account nd control of gov it
funds. This has been even more pronounced since i of
Budget and c . c--untin g Procedures Act of 19 ?0, and further imple-
mentation of the so-called "oov r rt will undoubtedly increase
. tempo,
lie the Navy's financial I nt system must fit the
vy's oim unique needs, it must also meet t! objective
of full disclosure of t ry financial information
ired and required er authority, Shif m "zes the
need for P»QOgnll5ng the new concepts and the revolutionary need
Tor professional-typo 'cost* avtirencs:.. on the art of all co: -
lers, is new criterion, oven though alien, dote stable and
un-wanted by some 'warrior' e :iders, WMll : at all must not
only be 6 in naval tactics but nlso vmst do a cred. B job
of busin ent, Understanding aid utilisation of fiscal,
i#ttOUnting, budgeting, and other internal ncial control meas-
uros is no\r mandator; ccessful -.rati' «
uch ovor-uorhod ploa of 'military necessity ' will of
itself no lor. roduce | stent funds froi ry or
civilian s; to obtain 'oval of his projects, he must
also provide adequate end fiefonsible accounting, fiscal support
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all tae ~.;ay u- the line in order that the !Tavy Department itself
can show a fully justified budget.
It should be starkly clear the commander himself can never
e to have tine to personally collect, assemble, digest and inter-
prete the pertinent fiscal facts in order to properly determine
the best course of action; to ai^rive at the decision which would
fully consider the immense financial responsibilities now forced
n him* Yet neither can he safely • such a decision without
obtaining at 1< tst sone background of pertinent fiscal information.
If he cannot do the- detailed wor self, is un-willing
to decide on a course of action without ascertainable facts
hand, and cannot now legally or in r»od conscience professionally
aore the qost aspects of the problem at hand, what remains?
Simply a resort to the obvious: delegation of detailed worl: necess-
ary to develop the required information and prepare . : iq interpre-
tation to his logical staff assistant, a controller , whose staff
function it is to be completely informed on such matters. ; ?e can
gather, digest, arrange, inter -rote and present all pertinent
information ne ded by the co ler; in short, can prov:/ im
ose facts he needs to consider in arriving at a decision.
ore, like Eh c In afloat, gets
specific sail;!ng orders listing is destination, but be st
use their o\m judgment and discretion a thousand ti:;:os a day in
avoiding reefs and possibly f tal storms enroute to the destin-
ation set by those above; is free to steer his own course
but expert navigation is the way. r the activity




a controller I ..'If of his financial
responsibility, ho can diminish the onus of being an accountant.
By the medium of his controller, he can well antic: tie ahead of
a whether the results expected -./ill materialize, and can early
revise his policies and chan l course before it is too late
and he is on the rocks of financial ignor 21c .
It is firmly bolievod 'em e ider wil" ly
see his new fiscal responsibilit- Men e to his over-all
mana -c .ent skill, till administrative ability; as a Vital Jt
to his tacticl s'lll, which is oi" course his -id tradit-
ional interest* The basis for the develop ent of most skills is
some form of incentive; in this case, the incentive will be future
promotion initially. Even now, one of the newer factors on which
a naval officer* s fitness report is based is his demonstrated
economy in utilizing the materinl and personnel resources of his
command. As he comes to real:".. .t economy will be an increas-
ingly important factor in proving his fitness for » command
and greater positions of responsibility, that efficient (profitable)
command performance means more certain promotion and respect, he
will most certainly ask for and utilize the professional co:
tribution or his controller.
Ccmp-rable management in private industry already use
controllership co s to control and bud ons;
to find out .1 times whether objectives are b. it
they may e: poet in the way of profits or losses from oper ..;,
what the cash position will be from month I , the over-all
financi sition at taj 1 thi naval
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iding officer must and learn to live with and wlth-in
i limited budget j must knowfrom month to month,or even day to
whether or not he is achi s mission; he must Icno - as
of Ids funds (allotment) position in order to know where he stands.
too, must set a course and eon* 'bearing to confirm
that he remains on course, for he cannot ignore available facts or
merely guess hit position anymore Is counterpart in big-business.
The controller's contribution helps both -depressed exec-
utives eliminate most of the guess-work, .or he combines a wide
ran;e of technical financial IBM urity, objectivity,
and a fine sense of what constitutes an optimum balance insofar
as the c ' ". position and operations are concerned*
If 3heptieal of the controller ever attaining his full,
expanded role in the Navy, consider only the long, uphill fight
that the modern control concept had to overcome in private industry.
After almost fifty years, he is still fighting for recognition of
•j true worth in many industries. While avy will no doubt
italise on industr, ' progress to date and accept their proven
applications of con broilership, we should expect something 1
than over-night clamoring for contr s by all commanders.
Perhaps we in the Navy -.rill have controllers who will
themselves retard and slow final acceptance of their potential
contribution by endeavoring to falsely usurp operational auth-
ority; unquestionably we wll /e others wl.u, t !-ght-
ened enough to realize their purely s status, are so tech-
nical :ainded that they lava f resist every new program,
expansion or proposal propounded by line com: .and t •redict-
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ing dire fiscal results, or oven flatly reconmending rejection.
Others will weaken the controllers position and progress by
telling cor: sanding officers why they cannot -pursue a select-
course instead of telling them how they can do so, till others
will be. :jere accountants or clerks, doin g the Supply Corps
d bookkeepers have long since bean doing as 1 proper function;
and finally, torn will foredoom their their worth **al object-
ive fiscal ; ; rs, interpreters and budget advisor ^ting
3ir time on the many by-roads of 'details'.
I»et those of U3 who are sensitive of the true ;;oil -
contribution that control can , fervently f that any N
mis-guided souls will be greatly out-numbered and neutralised by
those who see thenselves in the proper niche and make the out-
standing rocord of which they are capable.
And while he doesn't make the decisions of connand,
may greatly influence them by the beneficial, objective present-
ation of pertinent fiscal f cts. At the • controller
is himself acquiring immeasuroable training advantages for •!• -
cise of high** command in his o\m. right when eligible. For
the the daily work for is • rider, his field is the sane as
that of the con anding officer and the executive officer Whoa
he serves; save for these two, who else la the command is, by
the very nature of hil work, experiencing ::he educationalbenefit
of over-all coLimand in-sight, 'or the (ft s an
lnt n all depart, ents and divisions; yet he is not saddled
with the diroct operating r sibil ' or any, im
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a detachment and objectivity which even the c
. vSLmr anc if c::oe~
utive cannot claim for they are burdened the responsibility
for all. fhe controller alone evote informed full-time to
financial analysis and study c &g fiscal pre s«
Proper exploitation by c id of this Staff controller
contribution can ensure the com andin? officer that hii decisions
are related to the financial facts sur Lag the situation at
hand, and are more closely co-i d and co-ordinated with other
factors which make for efficient, effective c tion.
In conclusion then, it said that the nil
controller's objectives and I are essentially sir.il
to those of his coir. :erclal pioneer: he offers the basis data,
information and fiscal services to ? t (co: mand) to
ensure adequate fina jel incident to I
1. Pre araticn and justification of the activity budget. Which
is the request for funds and the manner of intended expenditure; it
is the life-blood of operations.
2. Control of all funds and finances mad* available.
3. Analysis of opej la th at of objectives,
comparison with establ I standards, and correction of
deviations.
con '.roll concept, only recently legally and
formally recognized in the mil." est -lis-rtont, oust be e -
panded to I aior field con lands where utilisation presently is
merely peiv ve ra I, In order to attain max*
imum econo; Iciency of Baterl&ls, non«7j £•*•« B*l and
facilities throu :hout the entire in this
era of al ost prohibitive costs for even peace-time defense.
*
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